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Assessing financial reporting comparability across institutional settings: the case of 
pension accounting 
 
Abstract 
The drive for comparability of financial information is to enable users to distinguish 
similarities and differences in economic activities for an entity over time and between 
entities so that their resource allocation decisions are facilitated. With the increased 
globalisation of economic activities, the enhanced international comparability of financial 
statements is often used as an argument to advance the convergence of local accounting 
standards to international financial reporting standards (IFRS). Differences in the 
underlying economic substance of transactions between jurisdictions plus accounting 
standards allowing alternative treatments may render this expectation of increased 
comparability unrealistic. Motivated by observations that, as a construct, comparability is 
under-researched and not well understood, we develop a comparability framework that 
distinguishes between four types of comparability. In applying this comparability 
framework to pension accounting in the Australian and USA contexts, we highlight a 
dilemma: while regulators seek to increase the likelihood that similar events are 
accounted for similarly, an unintended consequence may be that preparers are forced to 
apply similar accounting treatment to events that are, in substance, different.  
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1.0 Introduction  
 
   The world-wide drive for developing and implementing international accounting 
standards has its genesis in the globalisation of economic activity, which led to 
“increased demand for high quality, internationally comparable financial information” 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), 2002, PS 4: paragraph 2).  An 
objective of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is  
“...to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable 
and enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent 
and comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting 
to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic 
decisions”. (International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2007: 
p.43). 1   
In this context, ‘comparability’ is a key factor in achieving the decision-usefulness of 
financial information. Until relatively recently, comparability of financial information has 
been considered one of the four principal qualitative characteristics (with relevance, 
reliability and understandability) in international and national conceptual frameworks that 
together make information in financial reports useful for decision-making.2  While 
comparability is now viewed as an ‘enhancing’, rather than a ‘fundamental’ characteristic 
in the IASB (2010b) conceptual framework, it is nevertheless essential for financial 
information to be useful. Comparable information enables users to evaluate trends in an 
entity’s financial position and performance over time, and evaluate those aspects in 
relation to other entities at one point in time and through time (IASB, 2010b: paragraph 
QC20). Thus, comparability exists when users of financial information are able to 
distinguish similarities and differences in economic activities within an entity and across 
entities. Expectations of inter-entity comparability now extend beyond national 
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boundaries for those countries that have adopted International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRSs).   
    This paper is motivated by the dearth of literature on comparability (Parker, 
1975; and Revsine, 1985), and observations that comparability is a construct which is not 
well researched (Schipper & Vincent, 2003: p.104) or well understood (Zeff, 2007: p. 
290). The IASB/Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)’s (2008c) exposure draft 
on an improved conceptual framework and the IASB’s (2010b) Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting highlight the need to improve comparability of financial 
information by reducing any (unintended) dysfunctional consequences that may flow, for 
example, from an overemphasis on uniformity or permitting too many accounting options 
for the same transaction (IASB, 2008c: paragraphs QC18 and QC19; IASB, 2010b: 
paragraphs QC23 and QC25). Yet, as Zeff (2007: p. 290) comments, comparability is a 
somewhat elusive concept in that we do not really know “when we have it, and when we 
do not”. Schipper (2003: p. 71) suggests that, as a first step, an assessment of the 
understanding of the current state of comparability is needed.  
    We address these concerns by first developing a comparability framework to 
distinguish different types of comparability and then apply that framework to pension 
accounting. Our comparability framework distinguishes between four types of 
comparability: “surface” comparability (Schipper, 2003: p. 67), “deep” comparability, 
“non-convergent” comparability and “intrinsic differences” comparability (see Figure 1 
in section 2)., We identify surface comparability and non-convergent comparability as 
carrying (potentially) dysfunctional consequences for financial statement users, while 
deep and intrinsic differences comparability do not. The IASB’s 2010 conceptual 
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framework also warns of the need to reduce surface and non-convergent comparability 
type events, although they do not employ this exact terminology (IASB, 2010b: 
paragraphs QC 24-25).   
Our analysis highlights how non-comparability can arise from implementing 
essentially the same accounting standard across different jurisdictions (surface 
comparability), and arise from the number of available options in the international 
accounting standards to represent a single event (non-convergent comparability).  
Accounting for defined benefit pension (DBP) funds provides an appropriate context for 
an investigation of comparability given that the IASB (2008a) is concerned about options 
in accounting standards that permit deferring the recognition of employee benefits, 
including pensions, leading to a lack of comparability. Also, the varying social and 
institutional arrangements for DBP funds across jurisdictions potentially change the 
underlying economic substance of the pension transaction so that global pension 
accounting standards may create a false appearance of increased comparability. Surface 
comparability that reduces inter-jurisdictional comparability may result.  
    The USA and Australian settings are chosen to compare pension accounting 
standards because, although similar on many economic and social dimensions, their 
differing institutional arrangements alter the underlying substance of the pension 
transaction, potentially leading to surface comparability between these two jurisdictions. 
Both pension accounting standards also permit options for the treatment of actuarial gains 
and losses (AGL), which can lead to non-convergent comparability where both intra- and 
inter-jurisdictional non-comparability does result.3 We focus on the number of accounting 
options permitted for AGL, although the IASB recently announced its intention to 
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eliminate the deferral option (IASB, 2010a: p. 4).4 This research is timely and contributes 
to the current debate on improving comparability of financial information with the aim of 
ensuring “like things … look alike and different things … look different” (IASB (2010b: 
paragraph QC23).    
Our comparability framework, outlined in the next section, considers how 
accounting standard setters may better assess comparability in practice. Section 3 
discusses the varying social and institutional pension contexts in the USA and Australia 
that affect the underlying economic substance of the DBP transaction and considers how 
these differing origins influence their accounting for the pension transaction. We apply 
our comparability framework to pension accounting and identify how underlying 
institutional differences leads to inter-jurisdictional non-comparability (that is, surface 
comparability), and allowing options for AGL leads to both inter- and intra-jurisdictional 
non-comparability (that is, non-convergent comparability).  In Section 4 we conclude that 
assessments of comparability are incomplete if they do not consider the four-way analysis 
of comparability developed in this paper. The broad approach of the IASB that overlooks 
differences in institutional settings and permits optional accounting treatments may 
potentially decrease cross-sectional comparability across and within jurisdictions. This 
research is potentially generalisable to other accounting issues that pose comparability 
difficulties, such as the classifications and varying optional treatments permitted under 
AASB 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement.    
 
2. A Comparability Framework  
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    The IASB’s Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2010b) identifies 
relevance and faithful representation as the two ‘fundamental’ qualitative characteristics 
for information to be useful for decision-making. Information is relevant if it makes a 
difference (that is, has predictive value, confirmatory value or both) to the decisions of 
capital providers (IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC5).  Once the relevant economic events to 
be depicted are decided, these depictions must be faithfully represented. Faithful 
representation of financial information occurs when the economic event is reported in a 
way that is complete, neutral, and free from material error (IASB, 2010b: paragraph 
QC12). Paragraph QC19 complements these fundamental characteristics with the four 
‘enhancing’ qualities of comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability that 
financial information should possess to distinguish more useful information from less 
useful information. Such characteristics are considered to be ‘enhancing’ because, 
individually or collectively, they cannot make financial information useful for decision-
making unless that information is relevant and faithfully represented.  
    Of these fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics, our focus is on 
comparability, which is claimed to be an impetus for worldwide convergence with IFRS 
aimed at entities producing internationally comparable information to capital providers 
(Nobes and Parker, 2008: 76). Given that the “essence of decision making is choosing 
between alternatives, … information about an entity is more useful if it can be compared 
with similar information about other entities …” (IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC20).  Thus, 
comparability does not relate to a single item (IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC21) but is the 
“quality of the relationship between two or more items of information” rather than the 
quality of individual items (IASB, 2008c: paragraph QC17). Clearly, the fundamental and 
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enhancing characteristics of financial information are not independent. Although the 
IASB conceptual framework eschews the possibility of trade-offs occurring between the 
qualitative characteristics of information, relevance and faithful representation are not 
absolute properties of accounting information (Whittington, 2008: p.146). Any such 
tension may be resolved, in practice, by reference to an overriding principle, such as a 
“true and fair” view (Alexander, 1999: p. 240).  
    Comparability is difficult to identify (Zeff, 2007: p. 290), measure and quantify, 
although variations of measurement exist in the accounting context. Examples of research 
that attempt to measure comparability include Revsine (1985) and Krisement (1997). 
This research borrows from information system dynamics and industrial concentrations 
(using entropy) respectively. Zeff (2007: p. 290, 294) reasons that accounting is an 
artefact, and, unlike physical objects, it is difficult to perceive and identify “like” and 
“unlike” things in the accounting context. The debate thus becomes philosophical (Zeff, 
2007: p. 294). Empirical research that captures comparability from the point of view of 
the users of the financial statements suggests that greater comparability of earnings 
information is associated with more accurate analysts’ forecasts, and less bias and lower 
dispersion in those forecasts (De Franco, Kothari & Verdi, 2009: p. 3). As such, 
comparability benefits capital market participants by reducing the cost of acquiring 
financial information, and increasing the quantity and quality of that information.  
    Although the comparability debate is likely to escalate in the context of 
international convergence, Zeff (2007: p. 294) states that the “conundrum of accounting 
comparability and how it is to be achieved” has not been addressed in the debate; he 
cautions that enhanced comparability is not a surety (Zeff , 2007: p. 290). In the context 
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of IFRS, Zeff (2007: p. 294) reduces the argument to whether consistent accounting 
methods across the globe result in “genuine” comparability or “superficial” 
comparability. Similarly, the IASB (2008c: paragraph QC18; 2010b: paragraph QC24) 
warns against “superficial” or surface comparability.  
    Two issues emerge from the (limited) literature on the concept of comparability 
that forms the basis of the comparability framework we develop. First, a necessary 
precondition for comparing two sets of information is that each set faithfully represents 
the economic event on which the information is reporting; that is, the information is a 
‘true’ representation of the underlying economic substance of each event. For users of 
financial information to be able to compare alternative investments, the same economic 
circumstances need to be accounted for in the same way (Krisement, 1997: p. 466; 
Sprouse, 1978: p. 64). By inferring that the underlying economic substance of events 
must be the same or similar, we acknowledge that this assessment of similarity involves 
professional judgement (and within certain professional boundaries, contains 
subjectivity).  
   The second issue is that accounting methods used to depict each of the economic 
events are the same and are applied consistently across time for the one firm and between 
firms at one point in time for the one event. (IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC22). The IASB 
(2010b: paragraph QC22) draws a distinction between comparability as the outcome or 
the goal, and the process of comparability, achieved by applying consistent accounting 
policies and procedures to similar events. Comparability is also different from uniformity 
because the latter may subsume real comparability and force unlike things to look alike 
(IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC23). Uniformity can refer to uniformity of accounting 
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treatment or uniformity of the presentation of accounting information (we focus on 
accounting treatment).  
   To the extent that optional accounting treatments for the same economic event are 
tolerated by accounting standard setters, consistency of accounting method is difficult to 
achieve. That is, comparability will not automatically result from the use of consistent 
accounting methods across time for the one firm or between firms at one point in time 
unless the economic substance for the event being compared is similar, and/or sufficient 
disclosures are made. If optional accounting treatments (for similar underlying economic 
substances) are tolerated by standard setters, then different accounting methods for 
similar economic events will result. For example, pension accounting permits alternative 
accounting options for AGL so that different accounting methods are used for similar 
events.  
   The above dimensions are shown in Figure 1 as a two-way matrix, with the two 
alternatives for accounting methods (same/different) depicted in the rows, and the two 
alternatives for economic substance (similar/dissimilar event) displayed in the columns.   
 
(insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
    The top left-hand cell of the Figure 1 matrix shows that if similar economic events 
are treated the same from an accounting perspective, this corresponds to deep 
comparability. Deep comparability implies that there are no accounting options and as a 
consequence, similar arrangements are treated the same. In this case, if an IFRS 
accounting method is applied consistently across and between firms, both inter- and intra-
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jurisdictional comparability is achieved. As such, comparability is the outcome and 
consistency is the means (see IASB, 2010b: paragraph QC22). On the other hand, the 
bottom left-hand cell of Figure 1 shows non-convergent comparability arises where 
alternative accounting treatments are permitted to be applied to similar underlying 
economic events. Some IFRSs permit options to accommodate domestic needs of 
different countries and so options within international accounting standards are common. 
For example, IAS 19 Employee Benefits currently permits three options to account for 
AGL. As a result, if the selected accounting method varies between entities, but the 
underlying economic events are in substance similar, both inter- and intra-jurisdictional 
comparability are impeded. It could be argued that note disclosure of the accounting 
method used alerts users to those differences in accounting treatments, enabling them to 
take those differences into account in their comparisons (Gordon, 2007: p. 67). However, 
making such adjustments to the numbers reported in financial statements is not a trivial 
task for most users. Note that if the chosen accounting method is applied consistently 
across time for the one firm, then this should assist comparability of information in this 
limited instance.   
    The top right-hand cell of the Figure 1 matrix represents the situation where the 
same accounting method is applied to dissimilar economic events. Applying the same 
accounting treatment to “substantively unlike things” implies surface comparability that 
may mask the underlying non-comparability (Schipper & Vincent, 2003: p. 104). Such 
surface comparability can arise where transactions occurring in two different entities 
might appear to be similar and are accounted for in the same way, but the underlying 
economic events fundamentally differ. For example, institutional differences between 
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jurisdictions may be overlooked so that the same accounting treatment is used across 
jurisdictions even when the underlying economic circumstances vary. As noted by Zeff 
(2007: p. 291), differing business, financial and auditing cultures, including varying 
institutional and regulatory arrangements are impediments to “genuine worldwide 
comparability”. To this extent, surface comparability reduces inter-jurisdictional 
comparisons. In this case, consistency of accounting method between firms at one point 
in time does not assist comparability because the underlying economic substance differs 
(although comparability for the one firm over time is achievable).  
    The bottom right-hand cell of the Figure 1 matrix shows the situation where 
dissimilar economic events are accounted for using different accounting methods. We 
refer to this as intrinsic differences comparability. For some transactions, apposite 
accounting treatments of intrinsically different economic events may enhance 
comparability, although at first glance this may not be obvious. On the other hand, the 
underlying economic substance and the accounting for these events may be so different 
between firms that comparability may not be possible, or subject to additional 
disclosures.   Accounting standards that focus on the reporting of management intentions, 
such as IAS 8 Operating Segments emphasise predictive ability at the expense of 
comparability (Schipper, 2003: p. 63). In this case, the value offered to users of financial 
reports by managerial insights is emphasised rather than comparability of segment 
information, although the two may be achievable. To the extent that intrinsic value is 
added by the entity-specific disclosures, the decision usefulness objective of financial 
information is satisfied. Consistency of accounting method first, by the one firm over 
time and second, between firms at one point in time may contribute to comparability, but 
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in the latter case it is likely that apposite disclosures would also be required to achieve 
this.  
    The comparability framework shows that in circumstances where deep 
comparability and intrinsic differences comparability arise, the decision-usefulness 
objective of financial reporting is more likely to be met than where surface comparability 
and/or non-convergent comparability are present. These latter two dimensions represent 
dysfunctional aspects of comparability, potentially reducing the usefulness of 
comparisons between two or more sets of financial information, especially for 
comparisons between firms. Therefore dysfunctional comparability should be the focus of 
standard-setters in their endeavours to eliminate the possibility of such non-comparability 
arising from application of global accounting standards.   
   
3.  Applying the Comparability Framework to Global Pension Accounting   
 
    We use pension accounting to apply our comparability framework for two 
reasons. First, complexities and variations in pension rules and regulations across 
countries have contributed to the difficulties of developing a universal pension 
accounting standard that is applicable internationally (Kiosse & Peasnell, 2008: p. 15). 
Differences in institutional arrangements that affect the sharing of risks between the 
parties to the pension contract alter the underlying economic substance of the transaction, 
creating challenges for international accounting standard setters to ensure that similar 
(dissimilar) underlying economic arrangements are accounted for similarly (dissimilarly). 
The USA and Australia are selected for analysis because, although the USA and Australia 
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are similar on many economic and social dimensions, DBP funds in each of the two 
countries have different origins and institutional arrangements, which leads to significant 
differences in the economic substance of the pension transaction in these two 
jurisdictions (Gordon, 2007: Chapter 2). Such differences are likely to explain why, when 
in the early 1990s the Australian standard-setter attempted to introduce a pension 
accounting standard that was closely modelled on the originally proposed USA standard, 
it was unsuccessful (Lambert & Gallery, 1996). Consequently, until convergence with 
IFRS in 2005, Australia lagged overseas jurisdictions with respect to accounting for 
pensions. 
    Second, we are prompted by the IASB’s (2008a) ED comment that current 
options in (pension) accounting standards for deferring the recognition of employee 
benefits leads to a lack of comparability. These options were originally included as part 
of the provisions of the international pension accounting standard IAS 19 and the USA 
standard SFAS 87 Employers’ Accounting for Pensions (and its preliminary ED). 
Similarly, Australian pension accounting standards (since 2005) include the deferral 
options. Thus, it could be said the thinking of the standard setters in each jurisdiction 
(FASB, AASB and IASB) on pension accounting has been like-minded.   
 
3.1 Effects of Social and Institutional Contexts of Pensions on Comparability 
 
    Pensions originated in the USA as a type of disability payment for rank and file 
workers if they suffered workplace injury, and later extended to include a retirement 
payment (Bateman, Kingston & Piggott, 2001: p.39). In Australia, on the other hand, 
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pensions were originally considered to be a managerial gratuity largely reserved for 
senior (office) workers and top management (Ward, 1998: p.12).  Since their beginnings, 
DBP funds in the USA were predominantly non-contributory, where only employers 
contributed to the plan.  By contrast, in Australia most DBP funds are contributory, with 
both employers and employees contributing (Senate Select Committee on 
Superannuation, 1991). Consistent with the participatory funding of benefits in Australia, 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) (SIS) Act 1993 requires equal representation 
between the employer and the employees on the fund’s board of trustees (Gallery, 1999: 
p. 230), while in the USA, the fund board of trustees is normally appointed by the 
employer. Table 1 presents some of the key differences between the two countries.   
 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 
    A complex regulatory system was established in the USA to protect the pensions 
of the ordinary workers (Langbert, 1996). Dating back to 1974, The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation 
(PBGC) legislation is a guaranteed benefits system that uses termination insurance to 
curb opportunistic behaviour by sponsors abandoning under-funded DBPs and associated 
pension liabilities by enforcing the PBGC lien over the net worth of the sponsoring 
employer in the event of a plan termination. In contrast, Australian legislation is 
relatively recent5 with few provisions applying exclusively to DBPs (Gallery, 1999; Ang, 
Gallery & Sidhu, 2000: p. 53).  Furthermore, there is no system of termination insurance, 
with Australian policy-makers taking a market-oriented approach of relying on good fund 
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governance practices, rather than guaranteeing benefits (Roberts & Larkin, 1994). That is, 
the institutional rules in Australia do not impose a statutory duty upon employers to make 
up any DBP deficits, and there is no statutory recourse to the sponsoring employer to 
fund any deficits in the event of fund termination.  
    In the USA, recourse to sponsoring employers’ assets and penalties imposed on 
employers for underfunding effectively creates a legal nexus between the employer and 
the pension fund. This legal nexus, together with the dominance of employers governing 
DBP funds’ boards, suggests that the fund and employer are part of the same economic 
entity. In contrast, the absence of statutory obligations for Australian employer entities to 
make good any shortfall in the DBP funds they sponsor, combined with the sharing of 
plan governance through equal member and employer board representation, suggests that, 
in substance, Australian DBP funds are not part of the sponsoring employer’s economic 
entity.  
    These varying institutional rules carry implications for pension accounting. In the 
USA, the pension accounting standard (SFAS 87, replaced by SFAS 158 Employers’ 
Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, 2006) requires 
employer-sponsors to disclose any DBP fund surpluses or deficits, and to, at least partly, 
recognise in their accounts any DBP deficits.6 This economic entity approach assumes 
that the employer remains liable for promised benefits, and an employer’s contribution to 
the DBP fund merely shifts assets within the economic entity (Miller, 1987). When it was 
introduced, the international standard IAS 19 similarly required disclosure of any DBP 
fund surplus or deficit, and allowed the same partial recognition of DBP liabilities in the 
balance sheet.7 In Australia, the AASB followed the FASB’s initial approach and 
 17
proposed recognition of DBP fund deficits, and in addition, the fund surplus. This 
proposal met with considerable opposition from the corporate sector and superannuation 
industry (Ang et al, 2000: p. 41), to which the AASB responded by issuing a standard 
(AASB 1028 Accounting for Employee Entitlements) with no requirements to recognise 
pension obligations. Companies were required to provide only limited disclosures about 
the funding status and contributions paid to the DBP they sponsored.  
    The Australian standard setter’s attempt to import USA pension accounting 
innovations is likely to have failed because they did not appreciate the significance of the 
varying social and institutional arrangements on the accounting for pensions (Ang et al, 
2000: p. 53). In the absence of a statutory nexus between the employer-sponsor and the 
pension fund, it could be argued that Australian companies’ obligation to fund any DBP 
shortfall is only a constructive and contingent liability. As Napier (2009: p. 238) notes, 
clearly distinguishing between legal and constructive obligations in the pension context 
may be difficult, but the employer’s present pension obligation and the proximity of 
settlement are overriding factors. The appropriate accounting treatment for such a 
contingent liability (under IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets and AASB 137) is not to recognise it in the accounts, but to disclose it in the 
notes.  However, when Australia converged to IFRS in 2005, sponsors were required, for 
the first time, to recognise the net pension position in their balance sheets, even though 
there is no statutory requirement for sponsors to honour this obligation.  
    The implication for comparisons between Australian and USA companies, or 
companies in any other jurisdiction that imposes on them statutory DBP obligations, is 
that surface comparability is a likely outcome. That is, the underlying pension 
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arrangements between the two jurisdictions are not “like for like”, so that similar (or the 
same) accounting method is applied to, in substance, different (pension) transactions. 
Then, it becomes important to identify the pension liability so that the substantive 
differences in (pension) rights and obligations are communicated to users (Napier, 2009: 
p. 247). For example, BHP Billiton Limited has DBP funds operating in Australia, USA, 
Canada, South America, Europe and South Africa. BHP Billiton Limited is also cross-
listed in the USA (as well as the UK). The annual reports filed by BHP Billiton Limited 
to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the USA (accessed via Edgar Online) 
contain almost identical pension disclosures to those pension disclosures reported in 
Australia as at 30 June 2010. The net pension liability reported in both Australia and the 
USA as at 30 June 2010 in the consolidated balance sheet of BHP Billiton Limited was 
US$295 million. Therefore, the same pension liability was reported by BHP Billiton 
Limited in both jurisdictions yet the nature of the obligation differs. Similarly, Rio Tinto 
Limited has DBP funds located in the USA and Australia (as well as other countries) and 
reports a combined deficit of US$3,238m in the Statement of Financial Position in 2010 
in both jurisdictions. In relation to the companies’ DBPs that are located in the USA, the 
pension liability is guaranteed by a 30% lien over the net assets of the sponsor (a legal 
liability). However, for the companies’ DBPs that are located in Australia, no such 
statutory backing of pension liabilities exists (a constructive liability). These examples 
illustrate that, in substance, the companies’ pension obligations differ significantly 
between Australia and the USA, yet the liabilities are treated as homogenous for 
reporting purposes.  
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    Our comparability framework (Figure 1) highlights the connection between the 
economic substance of the transaction (as evident in local institutional rules) and the 
accounting for the transaction. Accounting for dissimilar arrangements (where the 
underlying economic substance varies due to legal differences) using the same accounting 
method is likely to result in surface comparability (refer Figure 1, top right hand cell). To 
the extent that international accounting standards gloss over the economic substance of 
transactions or differences in institutional settings, the risk of dissimilar arrangements 
receiving the same accounting treatment (that is, surface comparability) remains. Given 
the varying institutional pension arrangements across countries that alter the sharing of 
risks between the parties to the pension transaction (and therefore the economic substance 
of the transaction), the regulatory challenge for international accounting standard setters 
increases.  
 
3.2 Effects of Accounting Options on Comparability 
 
    In contrast to the different approaches taken by national standard setters in their 
respective jurisdictions (such as the FASB and the AASB), the international accounting 
standard setters either assume away inter-jurisdictional differences in institutional rules 
(discussed in the previous section) and/or accommodate optional accounting treatments 
for the same underlying economic reality. In the past, IFRS typically accommodated local 
needs by permitting a number of accounting options. For example, International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 19 (that closely follows the USA pension accounting standard 
(SFAS 87, 1985 replaced by SFAS 158)) currently permits a variety of accounting 
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treatments for AGL, including the “corridor” method. More recently, the IASB (2010a) is 
proposing that these options be removed so that all changes in the pension asset/liability 
are recognised immediately. As optional accounting treatments for AGL are removed 
from IFRS, the incidence of non-convergent comparability should decrease with a 
concomitant increase in deep comparability. However, if, by removing the options, firms 
have fewer choices to represent the underlying substance of the pension transaction, then 
an inadvertent consequence that contributes to the regulatory dilemma may be that 
surface comparability increases. 
    Pension accounting standards in the USA and Australia were subject to substantial 
social and political debate during their development (Francis, 1987; Saemann, 1995; Ang 
et al, 2000: p. 62). As a consequence, compromises and concessions were especially 
evident in pension accounting standards in the USA (Daley & Tranter, 1990: p. 15). For 
example, SFAS 87 and later, SFAS 158, contain accounting concessions and detailed 
rules to suit local needs.  To soften the impact of pension accounting on sponsors’ profit 
and loss and balance sheets, the controversial accounting concessions introduced by 
SFAS 87 included the corridor method of accounting for AGL and the “minimum 
liability”, which required only part recognition of pension obligations.  
    IAS 19 similarly allows the corridor method and other options to account for 
AGL. The corridor method is essentially a delayed recognition or smoothing technique 
for the treatment of AGL designed to reduce the reporting of large unexpected pension 
expenses.8 It has been criticised because it is arbitrary and deferred actuarial gains / losses 
do not comply with the definitions of assets / liabilities (Gordon, 2001: p. 58). Immediate 
recognition of AGL is also permitted by SFAS 158, provided it is consistent and the 
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method is disclosed. In addition to the corridor method, these accounting standards also 
permit alternative treatments of AGL including immediate recognition in the income 
statement and recognition directly in equity. Both BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto take 
actuarial losses of US$38m and US$786m respectively arising during the 2010 year to 
the Statements of Comprehensive Income.   
    The optional pension accounting treatments for AGL permitted by the 
international accounting standard setters is likely to result in non-convergent 
comparability. International accounting standards assume that generic accounting 
solutions with optional accounting treatments can be applied across jurisdictions, so that 
the same underlying transactions can be accounted for differently (see Figure 1, bottom 
left hand cell). To the extent that similar arrangements are accounted for differently 
between firms, given the available number of options for AGL, cross-sectional 
comparability of pension disclosures between firms within the one jurisdiction is likely to 
decrease. A likely outcome is that both intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparability is 
reduced, and non-convergent comparability is likely to result.  
 
3.3 Implications for Intra- and Inter-jurisdictional Comparability 
   
    Using the case of pension accounting and applying it to the USA and Australian 
contexts, the preceding discussion has highlighted that applying a common standard gives 
rise to two types of dysfunctional comparability: surface comparability and non-
convergent comparability. Institutional rules vary between nations, affecting the 
substance of the pension transaction, and uniformly applying an accounting standard to 
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intrinsically different economic events leads to inter-jurisdictional surface comparability. 
Allowing options in the pension accounting standard adds an additional layer of 
dysfunctional comparability, which we refer to as non-convergent comparability, limiting 
both intra and inter-jurisdictional comparability.    
    The problem of non-convergent comparability, where the economic substance of 
pension arrangements are similar, can be relatively easily addressed in practical terms 
(but perhaps not so easily in political terms) by eliminating options in the international 
pension accounting standard. Removing optional accounting treatments for similar 
transactions would result in deep comparability, both within and between jurisdictions. 
The problem of surface comparability, where the underlying economic events are 
different (for example, BHP Billiton Limited’s DBPs in Australia and USA with varying 
pension promises that are treated the same for reporting purposes), could be dealt with by 
including specific provisions that reflect institutional differences across or within 
jurisdictions. In this case, intrinsic differences comparability would be achieved, alerting 
financial statement users to underlying differences in the economic substance of pension 
transactions across jurisdictions. The IASB (2008c:  paragraph BC2.26) recognises the 
need to ensure “dissimilar phenomena are presented dissimilarly” in striving to achieve 
comparability of financial statement information. This basic principle also needs to be 
reflected in the pension accounting and other standards where economic events that 
appear to be similar, are in fact intrinsically different.  
 
4. Conclusion 
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    Comparability is a desirable attribute of financial information contained in 
international and national conceptual frameworks, in that it arguably assists users’ 
economic decision-making by permitting the evaluation of trends in an entity’s financial 
performance and position over time, and with other entities.  With the convergence of 
national accounting standards to IFRS, the argument is advanced that enhanced 
comparability of financial information will result. However, whether adopting IFRS 
achieves inter-entity comparability within and across national borders is contestable.  
This is because first, in the accounting context, it is more difficult to assess “like” and 
“unlike” accounting representations than for physical objects. Second, comparability of 
financial information is difficult to measure and quantify. Third, comparability depends 
upon the information being relevant and faithfully represented as a first condition, and 
then upon the chosen accounting method(s) being consistently applied both across firms 
and through time. As a result, one possible outcome of financial reporting is a 
“comparability mirage” that gives the impression that look-a-like economic events are 
being accounted for the same, but in practice this may not necessarily follow. It is not 
surprising that the comparability debate in the accounting context has had limited success 
in articulating how to achieve comparability.  
    We contribute to the comparability debate by developing a comparability 
framework that links similar/dissimilar transactions to similar/dissimilar accounting 
treatments. The framework is applied to global pension accounting. Our comparability 
framework distinguishes between four types of comparability: surface, deep, non-
convergent and intrinsic differences comparability. We show that for pension accounting, 
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the varying institutional and regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions impede efforts to 
achieve global comparability by promoting surface comparability.   
 In addition, the number of accounting options permitted by international 
accounting standard setters (for example, the optional treatments for AGL) is likely to 
contribute to non-convergent comparability. The IASB is modifying its approach of 
issuing accounting standards that contain optional accounting treatments in an effort to 
reduce non-convergent comparability. For example, recent moves by the IASB (2010a: p. 
4) to remove the corridor option for accounting for AGL are likely to reflect the above-
mentioned concerns. On the other hand, an unintended consequence of removing choice 
of accounting treatment may be to create dysfunctional surface comparability as firms 
have less choice to represent the underlying pension transaction.  
  Our comparability framework also highlights the difficulties faced by 
international accounting regulators when inter-jurisdictional differences intervene, and 
surface comparability is likely. Given that underlying pension transactions typically differ 
across jurisdictions, in an effort to curb surface comparability the challenge for the 
international regulators is to outline appropriate accounting treatments for these complex 
pension transactions in a generic way so that the incidence of risk is accurately reflected 
in the employer’s financial statements.9 Referring to the BHP Billiton Limited example 
earlier, the reporting of pension liabilities in the financial statements should clearly 
describe the differing risks assumed by the sponsor for DBP funds in the USA (higher 
risk) compared to DBP funds in Australia (lower risk). Due to the jurisdictional 
differences concerning the enforcement of the pension obligation, pension disclosures 
should indicate that the pension obligation in the USA represents a legal liability while 
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the pension obligation in Australia represents a constructive liability. In this way, users of 
financial information prepared under IFRS could be made more aware of the varying 
risks (and shortcomings) of the information provided to them, and apprised of how easily 
the comparability of financial information can be eroded.   
    Our analysis acts as a gentle reminder to preparers and users of financial reports 
of the difficult tasks faced by international standard setters. We contribute to the literature 
by challenging the general acceptance that convergence to IFRS necessarily enhances 
comparability of financial information, at least in the case of pension accounting. This is 
especially critical in light of the varying social and institutional arrangements in place 
across the globe. In applying global accounting standards, cognisance needs to be given 
to the multi-faceted way of looking at comparability along the lines of the comparability 
framework suggested by this paper. The outcomes of this analysis could also be relevant 
to other accounting issues that the IASB is considering, such as financial instruments. 
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Notes 
1 The forerunner to the IASB, the International Accounting Standards Committee’s (IASC) 1973 
Agreement and Constitution (paragraph 1) did not refer directly to comparability of financial statements nor 
to the users of the financial statements, but instead referred to worldwide acceptance and observance of 
financial statements. It was not until November 1988 that the IASC approved exposure draft E32: 
Comparability of Financial Statements (Camfferman and Zeff, 2006: p. 262).  
2  The IASB (2010b) now delineates these qualitative characteristics on the basis of those that are 
‘fundamental’ in distinguishing useful and misleading or not useful information, and ‘enhancing’ 
characteristics that distinguish more useful information from less useful information. ‘Relevance’ and 
‘faithful representation’ (instead of ‘reliable) are identified as fundamental qualitative characteristics, and 
‘comparability, ‘verifiability’, ‘timeliness’ and ‘understandability’ are considered enhancing characteristics.   
3 Actuarial gains and losses emerge when actuarial assumptions are not realised or actuarial assumptions 
change, for example, a change in the discount rate assumption. 
4 The optional accounting treatments for AGL include immediate recognition through the profit and loss, 
deferral methods such as the “corridor” method (see footnote 8) and recognition through equity statements.   
5 The Occupational Superannuation Standards Act came into effect in 1987, and was subsequently replaced 
by the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act in 1993.  
6 Requiring only partial recognition of deficits was a concession to constituents’ concerns that full 
recognition of the liability would adversely impact the balance sheet, and changes in that liability over time 
would increase volatility in reported income.   
7 Standard setters permit three possible methods to account for actuarial gains and losses in the income 
statement. Of these alternative accounting treatments, the corridor method is an income smoothing tool 
aimed at shielding income from volatility due to market movements.  
8 SFAS 87 paragraph 32 permitted recognition of AGL outside a 10% corridor (if net cumulative 
unrecognised AGL exceed the greater of 10% of the projected benefit obligation or 10% of the fair value of 
plan assets).The minimum amount that an entity should recognise was that part that fell outside the corridor 
at the end of the previous reporting period, divided by the expected average remaining working lives of the 
employees participating in that plan. The interval +10% acts as a corridor within which gains and losses are 
not recognised (Dufresne, 1993: p.2). 
9 In a discussion with one of the authors, Ken Peasnell proposed that, as a starting point, the varying levels 
of risk that attach to pensions across jurisdictions could be addressed as a way to acknowledge that all 
pension liabilities do not carry the same level of risk.  We draw on Ken Peasnell’s idea in proposing how 
the pension accounting problem might be addressed.   
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Figure 1: Comparability Framework 
  Economic Substance 
  Similar Event Dissimilar Event 
Accounting 
method 
Same  
(no options)  
 
Deep comparability 
 
Surface comparability 
 
 
Different  
(including options) 
  
Non-convergent 
comparability 
 
Intrinsic differences 
comparability 
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    Table 1: Comparison of the Social Context of Defined Benefit Pension Funds in the 
USA and Australia (adapted from Ang et al. (2000:  p.69) and Gordon (2007: p. 
37)) 
Feature USA Australia 
Genesis Disability entitlement that later  
extended to retirement entitlements 
Retirement entitlement motivated to 
avoid fidelity insurance by bondsmen 
of the bank (for job protection) 
Industries where first introduced Railways and mining Banks, insurance and financial 
institutions 
Early nature of pension arrangement Dependent upon the benevolence of 
management but regarded as deferred 
payment 
As a managerial gratuity 
Basis of membership Generally covered all employees of 
firms with DBP  funds.  
Generally limited to senior employees 
and management  
Legislation and year of enactment  Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act 1974  
Plus over 15 additional statutes 
enacted over the next 30+ years, and 
Pension Protection Act (2006).     
Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993  
(superseded the Occupational 
Superannuation Standards Act 1987)  
Funding arrangements  Generally non-contributory  
(only employers contribute) 
Generally contributory  
(both employers and employees 
contribute) 
Fund governance structure Pension plan trustees are usually 
appointed by the employer  
SIS requires equal numbers of 
employer and member representatives 
on a pension fund’s board of trustees.  
Statutory insurance guaranteeing 
benefits of underfunded DBPs that 
are terminated    
Yes  - provided through Pension 
Benefits Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC) 
No 
Recourse to employers for terminated 
DBPs that are underfunded 
Yes - PBGC 30% lien over firms’ net 
worth 
No 
Funding status  Underfunding is common.  Generally fully funded  
Penalties for failing to meet minimum 
funding requirements  
Penalty tax imposed on sponsoring 
employers 
No statutory penalties imposed on 
sponsoring employers  
 
                                                 
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
